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CASE COMMENTS
"COMMODITIES" UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
The Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act,' amending the
Clayton Act,2 provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person.., to dis-
criminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like
grade and quality...." The Robinson-Patman Act has been the sub-
ject of much criticism and confusion 4 with the terminology of the Act
being a particular source of trouble5 The definition of the term
"commodities" within what is commonly referred to as section 2a
of the Act0 has recently become a subject of concern in Robinson-
Patman Act litigation. The courts have restricted the term "com-
modities" to tangible personal property," while excluding price dis-
crimination involving service contracts and privileges8 from the
operation of the Act.
In Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. UPI9 the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held that the sale of the privilege of using UPI's
news report service does not constitute a commodity under section
2a of the Robinson-Patman Act. Tri-State is a Georgia radio broad-
casting company that claimed UPI discriminated by charging it a
substantially higher price for UPI's news report service than other
stations in the area. The court dismissed the suit on the ground that
the news information service is not a "commodity" within the con-
templation of the Robinson-Patman Act.' 0 Even though Tri-State re-
149 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a-f) (1964); 49 Stat. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 13a, 13b, 21a (1964).
238 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1964).
149 Stat. 1926 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964).
'See Symposium: The Robinson-Patman Act-Retrospect and Prospect, 17
A.B.A. SEcr. OF ANTI-TRUsT LAW 295 (1960). McLauglin, The Courts and The
Robinson-Pitman Act; Possibilities of Strict Construction, 4 LAW & CoNmTN'. PROB.
410 (1937); Morton & Cotton, Robinson-Patman Act-Anti-Trust or Anti-Consumer?
37 MINN. L. REv. 227 (1953); Rowe, The Evolution of the Robinson-Patman Act:
A Twenty Year Perspective, 57 CoLum. L. REv. 1059 (1957).
5Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 78 (1953)-
'Courts and legal writers often refer to the Robinson-Patman Act as it was
drafted, thus the designation section 2a but upon being enacted into the United
States Code this section became 15 U.S.C. § i(a) (1964).
7Gaylord Shops, Inc. v. Pittsburgh Miracle Mile Town & Country Shopping
Center, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 400 (W.D. Pa. 1963).
8See Fleetway, Inc. v. Public Serv. Interstate Transp. Co., 72 F.2d 761, 763
(3 d Cir. 1934); Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 295 F.2d
375 (7 th Cir. 1961).
0369 F.2d 268 (5 th Cir. 1966).
'OId. at 269.
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ceived written news reports, the court held that the dominant purpose
of the transaction was the transfer of an intangible privilege to broad-
cast news information even though tangible objects were incidentally
involved.11
A similar result was reached in CBS v. Amana Refrigeration Co.
1 2
where the court rejected Amana's contention that in the sale of
network television time, CBS discriminated by granting a lower price
to other sponsors, including competitors. The court rejected Amana's
argument 3 and held that the sale of television time was the sale of
a privilege of being identified with the program as a sponsor and
advertising during the alloted time, and not the sale of a commodity.
14
An informal ruling of the FTC supports the view that sales of adver-
tising or broadcasting time are not sales of commodities within the
terms of the Act.15
In addition to the exclusion of sales of privileges, a second category,
services, is excluded from Robinson-Patman Act coverage. General
Shale Products Corp. v. Struck Construction Co.' 6 held that there was
no sale of a commodity under a contract between the defendant con-
struction company and a municipal housing corporation which had
awarded the company a job. The bid submitted to the commission
included the use of a certain type of brick. The construction company
agreed to reduce the bid if the commission would use another type
of brick. The company negotiated with the seller of the brick to
buy it at a reduced rate. The construction company in turn included
it in the new bid at an even lower rate absorbing the loss themselves.
This in effect resulted in the sale of the brick to the housing com-
mission at a lower rate than to other purchasers. Plaintiff, a rival
brick seller, brought suit claiming that the defendant construction
company sold the brick at a price lower than that at which it was
purchased, thus destroying competition in the brick market. The
1id. at 270. The court cites General Shale Prods. Corp. v. Struck Constr. Co.,
132 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 780 (1943).
12295 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. g6i).
"Amana argued that the transaction was a sale of television time. CBS v.
Amana Refrigeration Co., 295 F.2d 375, 377-78 (7 th Cir. 1961).
"'Id. at 378.
'1See Rowe, PICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER TnE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT, 59 (1962).
Also see Scott Pub. Co. v. Columbia Basin Pub. Co., i8o F. Supp. 754, 770 (W.D.
Wash. 1959).
"132 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 780 (1943). The House
Judiciary Committee was unsuccessful in attempting to amend the act to include
services rendered by independent contractors. H.R. Res. 8277, 85 th Cong., 1st
Sess., 103 CONG. REc. 9898 (1957). See also 1o CONG. REc. 99o-99o (1957).
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court, however, held that there was no sale of a commodity because
this was a service contract, including work or labor in addition to
the brick. The contract was not divisible as to price so the dominant
purpose controlled, labor being a service not a tangible commodity.
Before the Robinson-Patman Act, Fleetway, Inc. v. Public Service
Interstate Transportation Co.17 held that under section 2a of the
Clayton Act, now amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, transporta-
tion by bus was not a commodity and thus not subject to the pro-
visions of the Act. The defendant operated a bus line in New Jersey.
When the plaintiff came into the business the defendant lowered
his prices on the routes on which he was in competition with the
plaintiff. The price of riding the bus remained the same on the other
routes. The court held that transportation was a service, not a
commodity, commodities usually being construed to relate to mer-
chandise.
A possible third area of exclusion is exemplified by Gaylord Shops,
Inc. v. Pittsburgh Miracle Mile Town and Country Shopping Center,
Inc.'s which defined a sale of "commodities" under the Robinson-
Patman Act as a transfer of chattels or the sale of personal property,
and did not include real estate.19 Gaylord Shops involved the owner
and operator of a shopping center, Pittsburgh Miracle Mile, which
allegedly discriminated against Gaylord Shops by favoring J. C. Penney
Co. with special provisions in the latter's lease.2 0
The rationale of the courts in these section two Robinson-Patman
Act cases seems to be that the object of sale must not be a privilege, a
service, or an interest in real property, to be considered a commodity. 21
This judicial interpretation of the term "commodities" is in accord
with congressional understanding of the term. Legislative history22
and later studies by Congress concerning the Clayton Act and the
amending Robinson-Patman Act indicate that only tangible articles
of commerce are covered. In addition the House Anti-Trust Subcom-
2772 F.2d 761, 763 (3 d Cir. 1934).
18219 F. Supp. 400 (W.D. Pa. 1963).
"Id. at 403.
'Plaintiffs did not allege any specific violation of the Robinson-Patman Act
but defendant and the court felt that only §§ 2a and 2e could be relevant. The
court then held that real estate is not a commodity under the terms of the Act.
-'See Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 59-62 (1962).
=The court in Tri-State refers to this point, the relevant citations are: 79
CONG. REc. 9078-79 (1935); Patman, THE ROBINSON-PATNIAN AcT 75 (1938). Repre-
sentative Patman indicated that the word is frequently used in the commercial
sense to describe any movable or tangible thing that is produced or used as the
subject of commercial transactions. Patman, COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE ROBINSON-
PATMAN Aar. 33 (1963).
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mittee on Television Broadcasting reported that the Robinson-Patman
Act covers only tangible commodities and not services.23 Perhaps an-
other indication that intangibles were not intended to be included is
the fact that Congressional hearings have been scheduled to consider
whether to include intangibles under this Act.
24
Section 3 of the Clayton Act contains terminology similar to that
in section 2a of Robinson-Patman. Section 3 forbids, in any lease, sale,
or contract to sell "goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or
other commodities...." the use of an agreement not to use goods
of competitors of seller.2 5 The Clayton Act was intended to supplement
other anti-trust legislation, especially the Sherman Act of 1890,2 6 and
to attack in their incipiency all agreements tending to lessen compe-
tition or create a monopoly. 2 The Supreme Court has not defined
the terminology used in the Clayton Act to enumerate the objects
which violate section 3. However, the lower federal courts have con-
sidered the problem and have reached conflicting results.
Analysis of the decision in United States v. Investors Diversified
Services, Inc.28 indicates that the interpretation of goods, wares or
other commodities under section 3 should be restricted to tangible
commodities. The court specifically states that a commodity is confined
to:
articles of the same kind, class, and character as those specifically
enumerated. The terms 'goods, wares, merchandise, machinery,
supplies,' were undoubtedly used in their ordinary sense by the
framers of the Act .... 'Commodities' therefore must be given its
usual and natural meaning. That meaning does not include
money which. .. is a medium of exchange.
2 9
However, Carter Carburetor Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n3 o held
that carburetors were tangible products and were included under sec-
tion 3 in spite of the fact that a service contract was of prime import-
ance in the tying arrangement. The court decided that the service
contract did not control. Other federal courts have also been more
liberal in their interpretation and have held that such things as a
'The court in Tri-State also notes the point. 369 F.2d at 270 n.2. Report on the
Antitrust Subcommittee on the Television Broadcasting Industry of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 85 Cong., 1st Sess., 66-67 (1957).
"Again the court in Tri-State takes note of this fact. 369 F.2d at 271 n.3. The
Gallagher Report No. 26 (June 3o, 1965).
"Clayton Act, 338 Stat. 73, (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964).
2"Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 26 Stat. 20o9 (189o), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964).
"Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 355-56 (1922).
"1o2 F. Supp. 645 (D. Minn. 1951).
"Id. at 648.
"112 F.2d 722, 730-31 (8th Cir. 1940).
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license (right or privilege) to manufacture certain patented products
31
are within the provisions of section 3.
The fact that many violations of section 3 of the Clayton Act may
be prosecuted under section i of the Sherman Act3 2 may be the reason
why the courts feel it is neither necessary nor logical to make the same
distinction concerning commodities as is made under section 2 of the
Robinson-Patman Act.
The result in Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. UP133 firmly establishes
the view that "commodities" under the Robinson-Patman Act in-
cludes only tangible articles of commerce, excluding privileges, serv-
ices, and interests in real property. One possible reason for the inter-
pretation is that any extension of the term beyond tangible personal
property would conflict with the built-in defense of the Act, such as
the like grade and quality test.
Unlike the section 2 cases, the cases under section 3 of the Clayton
Act do not so rigidly adhere to the distinction between tangibles and
intangibles nor do they use the idea of the dominant nature of the
transaction as controlling in order to exclude some contracts from
coverage.34 Perhaps the reason lies in the fact that the courts see a
purpose behind the Clayton Act which is in line with general anti-
trust policy. This same purpose is not discernible in the Robinson-
Patman Act and in many instances the courts tend to restrict the
Act to the purpose for which it was passed, to prevent monopoly by
large chain stores. In fact, since Robinson-Patman encourages a certain
price rigidity, the courts restrict its scope, perhaps feeling that it goes
'IRCA v. Lord, 28 F.2d 257, 260 (3 d Cir.) cert. denied, 278 U.S. 648 (1928).
Possibly the transaction may not have been violative of section 3 if the tying
arrangement had not involved the purchase of tangible products, radio parts.
See United States v. Loew's Incorporated, 37, U.S. 38 (1962); Northern Pac.
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958). The Supreme Court has also given the FTC
broad power to strike down any exclusive dealing arrangement which it deems
improper. FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 321 (1966); FTC v. Motion
Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953) (dictum). With the broad powers
given to the lower courts and the FTC, only the Justice Department is required
to adhere, in its prosecutions, to the strict terminology of section 3. It is not likely
that the Justice Department will be held to this strict standard and it is safe to
conclude that section 3 is a broad segment of the Act and in line with general
antitrust policy.
1369 F.2d 268 (5 th Cir. 1966).
' 4Compare General Shale Prods. Corp. v. Struck Constr. Co., 132 F.2d 425
(6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 780 (1943). (The court held that the dominant
nature of contract was service, thus the transaction was excluded from coverage
under Robinson-Patman even though tangible incidentals were involved); with
Carter Carburetor Corp. v. FTC, 112 F.2d 722, 730-31 (8th Cir. 1940) (The court
held that even though the service contract was of prime importance it did not
control and that carburetors ware tangible products included under section 3).
